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Abstract. We present improved quantum circuits for elliptic curve scalar multiplication,
the most costly component in Shor’s algorithm to compute discrete logarithms in elliptic
curve groups. We optimize low-level components such as reversible integer and modular
arithmetic through windowing techniques and more adaptive placement of uncomputing
steps, and improve over previous quantum circuits for modular inversion by reformulating
the binary Euclidean algorithm. Overall, we obtain an affine Weierstrass point addition
circuit that has lower depth and uses fewer T gates than previous circuits. While previous
work mostly focuses on minimizing the total number of qubits, we present various trade-offs
between different cost metrics including the number of qubits, circuit depth and T -gate
count. Finally, we provide a full implementation of point addition in the Q# quantum
programming language that allows unit tests and automatic quantum resource estimation
for all components.
Keywords: Quantum cryptanalysis, elliptic curve cryptography, discrete logarithm problem,
Shor’s algorithm, resource estimates.
1 Introduction
Shor’s algorithm [29,30] solves the discrete logarithm problem for finite abelian groups with only
polynomial cost. When run on a large-scale, fault-tolerant quantum computer, its variant for
elliptic-curve groups could efficiently break elliptic curve cryptography with parameters that are
widely used and far out of reach of current classical adversaries.
Barring the efficient classical post-processing of the measured data, Shor’s quantum algorithm
consists of three steps: first, a superposition of exponents is created, then those exponents control
the evaluation of a group exponentiation, and finally a quantum Fourier transform is applied to the
exponent register, which is then measured. The group operations in the exponentiation must be
computed in superposition and this is by far the most expensive step of the algorithm. Thus, the
precise cost of Shor’s algorithm depends on a detailed resource estimation for implementing the
group operation on a quantum computer. For solving the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem
(ECDLP), the relevant operation is the repeated controlled addition of classical elliptic curve points
to an accumulator point in a quantum register.
The first detailed discussion of the elliptic curve case was given by Proos and Zalka in [25].
Based on this work, Roetteler et al. [27] (hereinafter referred to as RNSL) presented explicit
quantum circuits for point addition and all its components and automatically derive their resource
estimates from a concrete implementation. Both papers focus on minimizing the number of qubits
required to run the algorithm, since its polynomial runtime implies that it will run fast once an
adversary has enough qubits to do so. They count the required number of logical qubits. For
example, RNSL estimate that Shor’s algorithm needs 2330 logical qubits to attack a 256-bit elliptic
∗ Partially supported by the University of Oxford Clarendon fund.
† Most of this work was done by Samuel Jaques, while he was an intern at Microsoft Research.
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curve. Under plausible assumptions about physical error rates, this could translate into 6.77 · 107
physical qubits [11]. But the number of logical qubits is not the only important cost metric, and
one might prioritize others such as circuit depth, the total number of gates, or the total number of
likely expensive gates such as the Toffoli gate or the T gate.
Our goal in this work is not only to improve the circuits proposed by RNSL [27], but also
to explore different trade-offs favoring different cost metrics. To this end, we provide resource
estimates for point addition circuits optimized for depth, T gate count, and width, respectively. We
also report on initial experiments with automatic optimization for T -depth and T gate count. By
using the automatic compilation techniques presented in [19], we find low T -depth and low T -count
circuits for a modular multiplication component and show significant improvements compared to
their manually designed counterparts, however, at a very high cost to the number of qubits.
Beyond alternative choices for low-level arithmetic components, we also improve the higher-
level structure of RNSL’s circuit. While many components stay the same, the most dramatic
improvements come from windowing techniques similar to those proposed by Gidney and Eker˚a in
[14] and a better memory management via pebbling. For example, instead of copying out the result
in an out-of-place circuit that uses Bennett’s method for embedding an irreversible function in a
reversible computation, the result can be used for the next operation before it is uncomputed. This
technique does not treat modular operations merely as black boxes, but can adaptively reduce the
cost of the higher-level circuit they are used in. Along with a reformulation of the binary extended
Euclidean algorithm, it significantly reduces costs for the modular inversion circuit.
One of our main contributions is a modular, testable library4 of functions for elliptic curve
arithmetic in the Q# programming language for quantum computing [31]. These incorporate
different possible choices for subroutines like addition and modular multiplication. Besides enabling
unit testing for all components, the Q# development environment allows automated resource
estimation.
We strictly improve RNSL’s estimates under all metrics. For example, for solving the ECDLP
on a 256-bit elliptic curve, we reduce the number of qubits from 2338 to 2124, improve the T -count
by a factor of 119 and the T -depth by a factor of 54. Asymptotically, we estimate that the number
of T gates in our circuit for Shor’s algorithm scales as 436n3 + o(n3).
Under a different trade-off optimizing for depth, our circuit costs 233 T gates with T -depth of
225 and 2871 qubits. Compared to RNSL, this is a factor 6000 reduction in T -depth with only a
22% increase in width. Asymptotically, our circuits can achieve 1115n3/ lg n+ o(n3/ lg n) T gates,
or 285n2 + o(n2) T -depth.
Extrapolating analogous values, breaking RSA-3072 would cost 234 T gates and 9287 logical
qubits [14]. This suggests that, at similar classical security levels, elliptic curve cryptography is less
secure than RSA against a quantum attack.
2 Preliminaries
This section only gives a very brief discussion of the basic concepts used in this work. For a more
detailed introduction to quantum computing, we refer to [24], for Shor’s algorithm see [29] and [30]
and for its ECDLP variant [25] and [27].
Quantum computing. A quantum computer acts on quantum states by applying quantum
gates to its qubits. A quantum state is denoted by |x〉 for some label x. We work entirely with
computational basis states, so x is always a bit string. As the fundamental gate set we use
the Clifford+T gate set and assume that the T gate is by far the most expensive, including
measurements. This is a plausible assumption because, in a quantum computer using a surface
code for error correction, T gates consume special states which require many qubits and many
surface code cycles to produce, and surface codes require frequent measurements for all gates
[10]. A quantum algorithm is described by a sequence of gates in the form of a quantum circuit.
4 Our code will be released under an open source license.
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We use standard quantum circuit diagrams, with black triangles representing output registers.
For circuit design and testing, we use circuits built from NOT, CNOT and Toffoli gates as those
can be simulated efficiently at scale on classical inputs [27]. However, for cost estimation, we use
decompositions over the Clifford+T gate set, such as the ones introduced in [1,12,28].
Shor’s algorithm for the ECDLP. Let an instance of the ECDLP be given by two Fp-rational
points P,Q ∈ E(Fp) on an elliptic curve E over a finite field of large characteristic p such that
ord(P ) = r, Q ∈ 〈P 〉. The problem is to find the unique integer m ∈ {1, . . . , r} such that Q = mP .
Shor’s algorithm applies a Hadamard transform to two registers with n+ 1 qubits initialized to |0〉
to create the state 12n+1
∑2n+1−1
k,`=0 |k〉 |`〉. Next, the state 12n+1
∑2n+1−1
k,`=0 |k〉 |`〉 |kP + `Q〉 is computed
using the elliptic curve group law. A quantum Fourier transform QFT2n+1 on n+1 qubits is applied
to both |k〉 and |`〉 and the 2(n+ 1) qubits in |k〉 |`〉 are measured. Classical post-processing then
yields the discrete logarithm m. We assume that the algorithm is modified using the semiclassical
Fourier transform method [15], which means that a small number of qubits can be re-used to act
as the 2n+ 2 qubits for |k〉 |`〉. RNSL use only one qubit for this [27], but we use more than one
to allow windowed arithmetic (see Section 5.1). The most cost-intensive part is the double-scalar
multiplication to compute |kP + `Q〉.
Functions as quantum circuits. The elliptic curve group law is built from various classical
functions that operate on bit strings of varying lengths n. For any function f , we use Uf to denote
a quantum circuit that computes f .
We often want Uf to compute f in-place, meaning it has the action Uf : |x〉 7→ |f(x)〉 on inputs
x ∈ {0, 1}n. If Uf is built out of Clifford+T gates, each gate is easy to invert; thus, an in-place
circuit Uf automatically yields an in-place circuit U
†
f that computes f
−1. As quantum circuits
need to be reversible, an in-place circuit is not always possible, e.g. if f is not injective.
As an example consider modular multiplication. Let p be an integer modulus. The function
f : (x, y) 7→ (x, xy mod p) is injective for inputs x, y ∈ Z/pZ that are co-prime to p. Its inverse is
modular division. At present, the best circuits we know to compute modular division use some
variant of the Euclidean algorithm. Thus, an in-place modular multiplication circuit would either
be more expensive than the Euclidean algorithm or would provide a state-of-the-art circuit for
modular division.
When an in-place circuit is not possible, Uf needs to implement f out-of-place as |x〉 |0〉n 7→
|x〉 |f(x)〉. Some circuits might require a number m of auxiliary qubits, such that
Uf : |x〉 |0〉n |0〉m Uf7−−→ |x〉 |f(x)〉 |g(x)〉 , (1)
where g is some function of the input. The auxiliary qubits are entangled with the other registers,
and g must be uncomputed before the end of the computation to restore them to their original
state. In our circuit diagrams, white triangles indicate such outputs.
If it is too costly to compute g(x) from x and f(x), one can use a method due to Bennett [4] to
clean any auxiliary qubits. By adding another n-qubit register, the output f(x) is “copied” to that
register using CNOT gates. Then, the inverse U†f is applied. This trick roughly doubles the cost to
reversibly compute f .
In a sequence of out-of-place circuits, uncomputing early steps prevents us from uncomputing
later steps. To make the full algorithm work, we either need to keep intermediate steps at the cost
of an increasing number of qubits or recompute them repeatedly at the cost of additional gates.
This is an instance of a general problem known as a pebbling game.
Controlled circuits. As larger circuits are composed from smaller ones, the smaller circuit often
needs to be controlled with a single qubit. We can “promote” each Clifford+T gate in the smaller
circuit into a controlled variant, which is expensive, e.g., for CNOT and Toffoli gates. Thus, we want
to optimize which gates we control. For example, a circuit using Bennett’s trick can be controlled
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by changing only the middle CNOT gates into Toffoli gates. For other circuits, we design controlled
versions as needed.
3 Components
Design strategies. A full cost estimate of Shor’s algorithm requires estimates at all layers of the
architecture, including error correction, layout, and possibly architecture design. We focus only on
the logical layer, and provide circuits that operate on abstracted logical qubits. From this level we
cannot decide which design choices will be optimal. A shallower circuit with more logical qubits
would have smaller error correction overhead and could have fewer physical qubits.
Thus, we provide different approaches and tradeoffs. We measure the T -depth, T -count, depth
including all gates, and total number of qubits used (“width”). We focus on three strategies,
favouring depth, T -count, or width. We could instead make different choices for each sub-circuit of
Shor’s algorithm, resulting in a large parameter space for potential optimization. Since we wrote
Q# functions for all circuits, future work could combine different choices for each step.
Toffoli and AND gates. As explained by RNSL in the introduction of [27], circuits that are
expressed as Toffoli gate networks can be implemented exactly over the Clifford+T gate set and can
be classically simulated and tested. Therefore, our circuits are designed using the same approach.
The only source of T -gates in such a circuit is from Toffoli gates. In many instances, we know that
the output qubit is in the |0〉 state and we can use a dedicated AND circuit with a lower T -count
instead. We use an AND gate design which combines Jones’ and Selinger’s AND gates [17,28]. It
uses 4 T gates, while a Toffoli gate uses 7, and the inverse AND† uses no T gates while Toffoli†
uses 7. AND gates use 1 auxiliary qubit for T -depth 1; Toffoli gates can use 4 auxiliary qubits for
T-depth 1 or none for T -depth 3, see [1].
Integer addition. The adder of lowest known T -count is Gidney’s modification of the Cuccaro
et al. adder [8] (hereinafter called the CDKMG adder), which uses only 4n T gates to add two
n-bit numbers, but uses n auxiliary qubits [12]. The adder of lowest known T -depth is the carry
lookahead adder of Draper et al. [9] (hereinafter the DKRS adder), with logarithmic depth but
2n−O(n) auxiliary qubits. The adder of lowest width is due to Takahashi et al. [32] (hereinafter
the TTK adder), which computes in-place using no auxiliary qubits. RNSL used the TTK adder.
The DKRS adder uses 10n Toffoli gates, but of these, 4n can be replaced with an AND or AND†
gate.
Controlled addition. We provide new methods for controlling the addition circuits. The DKRS
adder uses a circuit to propagate carries, which is uncomputed. These gates do not need to be
controlled. The remaining gates which must be promoted to controlled versions are all CNOT
gates, leading to only a slight increase in the T-count. To control the CDKMG adder, we promote
two CNOT gates per bit to Toffoli gates, as Figure 1 shows, and we change the final CNOT for the
carry qubit to a Toffoli gate. Unfortunately, for both addition circuits, the new Toffoli gates cannot
be replaced with AND gates.
Constant addition. When tackling an ECDLP instance, the prime modulus is a classically known
integer, and we need a circuit to add it to integers encoded in quantum registers. The simplest
method allocates a new quantum register, inputs the integer into the quantum register, runs any
quantum addition circuit, then uncomputes the integer from the quantum register to free the
qubits. This simple method is easy to control. Only copying the integer into the quantum register
is controlled, and then an uncontrolled addition is used, as shown in Figure 2a. Copying an integer
uses only X gates, so a controlled copy operation only uses CNOT gates, giving the same T -cost
as uncontrolled quantum addition. We use this strategy with the CDKMG and TTK adders.
4
ctrl
ck
xk
yk
ck+1 · · · ck+1
ck
xk
(x+ y)k
Fig. 1: Controlled addition block, adapted from [12].
An alternative is to “curry” the quantum addition circuit. In the DKRS adder, the qubits of
one of the two inputs are only used as controls for CNOT and Toffoli gates. We can replace these
with X and CNOT gates which are conditionally applied according to the bits of the classical
integer. A controlled classical addition with this method needs to control the entire curried circuit
(see Figure 2b), but we found that this is the most efficient approach with the DKRS adder.
|0〉
|x〉
|ctrl〉
n
n
c
+
c |0〉
|x+ c〉
(a) Copying the classical constant c is con-
trolled, followed by uncontrolled addition.
|x〉
|ctrl〉
n +c |x+ c〉
(b) The addition circuit is curried for the
constant c, then the full circuit is con-
trolled.
Fig. 2: Two methods for controlling addition by a constant c.
Comparing integers. An addition circuit immediately gives a comparator by the one’s comple-
ment trick. For integers x and y represented in binary, if we let x′ denote the one’s complement
(all bits flipped), then (x′ + y)′ = x− y. If y > x, then x− y < 0 and the leading bit of (x′ + y)′
will be 1. Thus, to construct a comparator, we simply flip all bits in x, compute the first half of an
addition circuit, copy out the carry, then uncompute the addition circuit. With a control, we only
need to control the final copy of the carry bit. We use this technique for comparators based on the
previous adders. DKRS provide a comparator which we did not use for ease of implementation.
Fan-out and fan-in of control qubits. When a single qubit controls multiple parallel gates,
they must be performed sequentially. To avoid this increase in depth, we opt to allocate extra
qubits and fan-out the control [22] to these qubits using CNOTs. Then these qubits can control all
the gates in parallel before we clear them again. For n simultaneous controlled gates, this requires
n auxiliary qubits and at most 4n CNOT gates in depth dlg ne, but no T gates. Our low-width
optimization does not do this.
The fanned-out auxiliary control qubits could be retained to control many gates, depending
on the application. Because the Q# language allocates qubits in a stack, this is often difficult. A
function that allocates clean auxiliary qubits must restore them to the |0〉 state before returning.
Because of this difficulty and the low gate cost of fan-out, we do not make such optimizations.
To control a single gate with the logical AND of n qubits requires a fan-in of control qubits.
For low width, we use Barrenco et al.’s method [3], as RNSL did. This performs a multi-AND
in-place but with 8n Toffoli gates and linear depth. If we instead allocate n− 1 auxiliary qubits
and “compress” the controls with a tree of AND gates, it requires only n − 1 AND gates and
AND-depth dlg ne.
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4 Modular arithmetic
Because modular reduction is irreversible, we cannot design an in-place circuit which maps x to
x mod N without creating some auxiliary qubits that represent the quotient bx/Nc. Any algorithm
for modular arithmetic that uses many modular reductions thus creates significant qubit overhead.
Instead, we design bespoke circuits for each operation. Primarily, we follow RNSL [27]. We find
that working in Montgomery representation [21] has the lowest costs. For an odd modulus p with
n = dlg pe, the Montgomery representation of an integer x is x2n mod p.
We use the modular addition circuit from RNSL. Note that addition in Montgomery repre-
sentation is the same as in standard representation. For controlled modular addition, we only
need to control two operations, as Figure 3 shows. This automatically gives us modular addition
by a constant, by replacing the quantum-quantum addition and comparison circuits by their
quantum-classical counterparts.
|x〉
|y〉
|0〉
|ctrl〉
n
n + −p +p >
Fig. 3: Controlled modular addition.
4.1 Multiplication and squaring
RNSL provide two circuits each for multiplication and squaring. We use the one that operates on
n-bit integers in Montgomery form with 2n additions and n halvings, and justify this choice in
Appendix A.1. This circuit is a direct translation of classical Montgomery multiplication.
Windowed arithmetic. Windowed multiplication, such as [13], is not directly possible in our
setting because we multiply two quantum integers, but we can adapt some of these techniques to
our setting. When computing x · y, the Montgomery multiplier uses the ith bit of |x〉 to control an
addition of |y〉 to the output register. It then copies the lowest bit of the output to an auxiliary
register |m〉 and uses this bit to control addition of the modulus p. This ensures that the sum is
even, and so we rotate the register to divide by 2.
When using a window of size k, the integer x is split into k-bit words x(1), . . . , x(n/k), analogous
to classical interleaved radix-2k Montgomery multiplication. The k-bit value x(i) is multiplied with
y, adding the (n+ k)-bit result to the output register. To add a suitable multiple of p to the output
to set the k least significant bits to 0, these k bits are copied to an auxiliary register mi. The
multiple tmip such that tmip+mi ≡ 0 mod 2k can be looked up from a classically pre-computed
table T , where T [mi] = tmip for tmi ≡ p−1mi mod 2k.
We use the bits in mi as an address for a sequential quantum look-up [2]
5, writing the resulting
(n+ k)-bit integer tmip into an auxiliary register. Then an uncontrolled addition of tmip into the
output register clears the bottom k bits, so we can cyclically rotate by k bits. Figure 4 illustrates
this process.
5 This technique is referred to as QROM in [2]; some papers also call it QRAM ; we use quantum look-up
to distinguish it from quantum random oracles and to emphasize that it is constructed out of Clifford+T
gates and does not require special QRAM technology.
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|x0〉
|x1〉
...
|xk〉
|y〉
|0〉
|0〉
...
|0〉
...
|0〉
|0〉
...
|0〉
|0〉
|0〉
n
k
n+k
+
+
+
+
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·
+
+
cpy Inmi
T [mi] +
+
Inmi
T [mi]
/2k
|x0〉
|x1〉
...
|xk〉
|y〉
|(xy)0〉
|(xy)1〉
...
|(xy)k〉
...
|(xy)n〉
|0〉
...
|0〉
|mi〉
|0〉
Fig. 4: Circuit for a single window of windowed add-and-halve multiplication. The cpy gate copies
k bits with k CNOT gates. The gate Inmi performs a quantum table look-up of T [mi], where T
is the table described in the text. The circuit in this figure is repeated dn/ke times, with a final
modular correction step, to perform a single modular multiplication.
Pebbling. Given integers x, y, and z, one method to compute xy + z in place is to first compute
xy in an auxiliary register, then to add it to the register containing z, and finally to uncompute xy.
This works for any generic multiplication circuit, but at the cost of two multiplications.
The circuit we use requires the Bennett method, and we replace its CNOT step with an addition.
This is just a pebbling technique [5]; we are keeping the auxiliary qubits until we have finished
the next computation (an addition) before uncomputing them. The cost of this multiply-then-add
is just the sum of the costs of a multiplication and an addition, rather than twice the cost of a
multiplication and an addition.
In particular, RNSL treat their squaring circuit as a black box in the full elliptic curve addition
circuit. The computed square is only needed for one subtraction before it must be uncomputed;
therefore we can use this multiply-then-add trick. Figure 5 shows how this saves almost half the
gate cost and depth of the squaring, as well as saving an auxiliary register.
|x1〉
|ctrl〉
|t0 = 0〉
|λ〉
|t1 = 0〉
|t2 = 0〉
n
n
n
n
n
squA squ−1A
-
-
squA squ−1A
(a) Original circuit [27] with squ circuit ex-
panded, squA produces dirty auxiliary qubits
in |t1〉.
|x1〉
|ctrl〉
|t0 = 0〉
|λ〉
|t1 = 0〉
n
n
n
n
squA
-
-
squ−1A
(b) More efficient version.
Fig. 5: Improvement to the squaring circuit from [27] in the context of elliptic curve point addition.
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Automatic optimization. The multiply-then-add operation is a very costly component in the
point addition circuit. We explore what is possible when reducing its T -depth and T -gate count.
Appendix E shows the results for a compilation using the method from [19] after automatic
optimization [33] of a logic network generated from the operation. We achieve extremely low
T -depth and T -count, but the number of logical qubits increases significantly. We leave further
exploration of such techniques for future work.
4.2 Modular inversion
Modular inversion uses variants of the extended Euclidean algorithm (EEA). The EEA repeatedly
divides integers. For two n-bit integers, we might expect each division requires O(n2) operations
and, in the worst case, we need O(n) divisions. In practice the complexity is smaller, because
the complexity of the divisions becomes smaller in the course of the algorithm. Unfortunately, to
exploit this fact, the circuit must be dynamic: The number of divisions and the circuit for each
division depend on the inputs. We cannot build such a quantum circuit, since we cannot observe
the input (it may be in superposition).
We considered several approaches, but found that RNSL’s circuit is the best. Appendix A.2
details our reasoning. However, we found several improvements to it. Their circuit models an
algorithm of Kaliski [18], which applies a round operation (Algorithm 7a) for up to 2n iterations.
Conditional logic selects one of four different cases that can occur in each round. As a quantum
circuit, this requires applying all four possible rounds, each with a different control. Algorithm 7b
shows our alternative formulation based on swaps.
Figure 6a shows the round operation of RNSL’s quantum circuit implementation of Kaliski’s
algorithm. This circuit repeats the controlled additions, doublings, and halvings, with different
registers playing the role of input or output. Our method performs each of these operations once,
using controlled swaps to arrange inputs and outputs for the respective case. The lower auxiliary
bit and |mi〉 uniquely specify the round and we use these bits to control a swap. This leads to
Figure 6b. A controlled n-bit swap is approximately the same cost as a controlled n-bit cyclic shift.
Correcting pseudo-inverses in parallel. Classically, the Kaliski algorithm uses only k rounds,
with n ≤ k ≤ 2n for n-bit integers. RNSL’s quantum circuit executes 2n rounds, controlled in such
a way that only k actually modify the input. This produces an auxiliary qubit counter with a value
of 2n− k and a pseudo-inverse output of x−12−n+k mod p for an input x. We want to output the
Montgomery inverse x−12n mod p, which requires correcting the pseudo-inverse.
Instead of a separate doubling circuit like the one RNSL use, we add a doubling operation to
each division round. After copying out the pseudo-inverse, during the subsequent uncomputation
we use the same control that the round operation uses: in each of the 2n rounds, either we double
the output register or perform a division round. These can be done in parallel, which improves the
depth without increasing the total gate count. The result is that we compute 2n− k doublings,
exactly what is needed to correct the pseudo-inverse.
Modular division. In elliptic curve point addition, the inversion is only necessary to compute a
division. To divide an integer x by y modulo a prime p, RNSL first invert y in an auxiliary register,
perform the multiplication by the result, then invert y again to uncompute the auxiliary qubits as
shown in Figure 8a.
Because the inversion uses Bennett’s method, we pebble in the same way as the multiply-then-
add circuit. To save qubits, we notice that after the inversion, three registers contain known values
of 0, 1, and the modulus p. We can clear these auxiliary qubits with at most 3n parallel X gates,
then re-use them for modular multiplication. Denoting the inverse and multiplication operations
with auxiliary qubits by invA and mulA, respectively, Figure 8b depicts a full modular division.
The pseudo-inverse correction is compatible with modular division.
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|carry = 0〉
|ui〉
|vi〉
|ri〉
|si〉
|b = 0〉
|a = 0〉
|mi = 0〉
n
n
n+1
n+1
- + /2
×2
/2
×2
-
+
/2
×2
-
+
/2
×2
|0〉
|ui+1〉
|vi+1〉
|ri+1〉
|ri+1〉
|0〉
|0〉
|mi〉
(a) Round operation from [27].
|carry = 0〉
|ui〉
|vi〉
|ri〉
|si〉
|b = 0〉
|a = 0〉
|mi = 0〉
n
n
n+1
n+1
> > −
+
/2
×2
|0〉
|ui+1〉
|vi+1〉
|ri+1〉
|ri+1〉
|0〉
|0〉
|mi〉
(b) Improved round operation.
Fig. 6: Improvement to the round operation in the binary extended Euclidean algorithm from [27]
addressing the different cases by controlled swaps.
(a) Kaliski’s algorithm
1: if u odd and v even then
2: v ← v/2
3: r ← 2r
4: else if u even and v odd then
5: u← u/2
6: s← 2s
7: else if u odd and v odd and u > v
then
8: u← (u− v)/2
9: r ← r + s
10: s← 2s
11: else if u odd and v odd and v ≥ u
then
12: v ← (v − u)/2
13: s← r + s
14: r ← 2r
15: end if
(b) Equivalent formulation
1: bswap ← false
2: if u even and v odd, or u and v both
odd and u > v then
3: swap u and v
4: swap r and s
5: bswap ← true
6: end if
7: if u odd and v odd then
8: v ← v − u
9: s← r + s
10: end if
11: v ← v/2
12: r ← 2r
13: if bswap then
14: swap u and v
15: swap r and s
16: end if
Fig. 7: Kaliski’s algorithm, and an equivalent formulation based on swaps.
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|x1〉
|y1〉
|ctrl〉
|t0 = 0〉
|λ〉
n
n
n
n
inv
inv
mul
mul
mul
inv
inv
(a) Inversion steps in elliptic curve
point addition from [27]. Auxiliary
qubits are not shown. Each inv
block represents invA, copying out,
then inv−1A (with the same pattern
for mul). Thus, this circuit contains
4 invA steps and 2 mulA steps.
|x1〉
|y1〉
|ctrl〉
|λ = 0〉
n
n
n
0
0
0
0
0
invA
invA
0
0
0
0
0
mulA
mulA
mul−1A
mul−1A
0
0
0
0
0
·22n−k
inv−1A
inv−1A
0
0
0
0
0
(b) More efficient modular division. 0` depicts initializing an aux-
iliary qubit to zero, and a0 depicts removing an auxiliary qubit
known to be zero. The doubling of the output λ in the last step
corrects the pseudo-inverse output.
Fig. 8: Improvement to the modular division circuit from [27] by clearing and re-using auxiliary
qubits before the full uncomputation.
5 Elliptic curves
Elliptic curve arithmetic has been heavily optimized for classical computers, but because Shor’s
algorithm requires unique representations of points and in-place point addition, few of these
optimizations apply. We find affine Weierstrass coordinates to be the most efficient method;
Appendix A.4 explains this choice in more detail.
Affine Weierstrass coordinates are one of the conceptually simplest methods, and RNSL use
them for their circuit. We assume the elliptic curve equation has the form E : y2 = x3 + ax+ b
with a, b ∈ Fp and we represent points by pairs (x, y) that satisfy this equation. Combining RNSL’s
circuit with the optimizations from this paper, we obtain the circuit in Figure 9. The total cost is
2 divisions, 2 multiplications, 1 squaring, and 9 additions.
The simple formulas with affine coordinates are naturally in-place. The general concept is the
same as in [27]. The original x and y coordinates are replaced by multiplying and adding to them,
and once we have, we can use the new coordinates to uncompute the slope. This also means that
the circuit produces incorrect outputs if P or Q is the point at infinity or if P = ±Q, because in
these cases the slope does not exist. Proos and Zalka [25] and RNSL [27] both argue that these
exceptional cases only slightly distort the desired quantum state in Shor’s algorithm and their
influence is negligible.
|x1〉 |x3〉
|y1〉 |y3〉
|ctrl〉 |ctrl〉
|λ = 0〉 |0〉
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
n
n
n
−x2
−y2 div
div
mul
mul
+3x2 squ−
squ−
mul+
mul+
div
div
−2x2
−y2
+x2 neg
Fig. 9: A single elliptic curve addition of a classical point P = (x2, y2) with a quantum point
Q = (x1, y1) in affine Weierstrass coordinates, with P + Q = (x3, y3). div indicates the circuit
from Figure 8b, squ− indicates squaring-and-subtracting (as in Figure 5b) and mul+ indicates
multiplying-and-adding.
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5.1 Windowed arithmetic
Shor’s algorithm uses 2n qubits as control qubits, half of which control circuits that add P , 2P ,
4P , etc.; the other half control addition of Q, 2Q, etc. The points are added to a single quantum
register which we call the accumulator. This process requires 2n point additions. We instead use a
windowed approach, analogous to ubiquitous classical pre-computation techniques and similar to
the techniques used for RSA in [14]. Other classical pre-computation strategies are less effective, as
Appendix A.5 discusses.
For windowed scalar multiplication, we use the index as an address for a sequential quantum
look-up, which loads a superposition of points O, P, 2P, 3P, . . . , (2` − 1)P into an auxiliary register
which we call the cache. For elliptic curves, this requires us to switch from a circuit adding a classical
point to a circuit adding two quantum points, but this has little effect on the cost. The depth and
T -count of the look-up are exponential in the window size `, but we save ` point additions.
Signed addition. We can save a factor of 2 in windowing by using one qubit to control the sign
of P = (x, y) and only using `− 1 for the look-up. Since −P = (x,−y), the extra qubit only needs
to control a cheap modular negation. This changes the indexing slightly. Our original windowed
circuit took an address register |b〉 and an input register |R〉, and produced |b〉 |[b]P +R〉. Using
the top bit b`−1 of b = b`−12`−1 + b′ as a sign and looking up b′P if b`−1 = 1 and (2`−1 − b′)P and
negating it if b`−1 = 0, we can implement the operation∑
b∈{0,1}`
|b〉 |R〉 7→
∑
b∈{0,1}`
|b〉 ∣∣[b− 2`−1]P +R〉 . (2)
Thus, we get an offset in each round, but since the offset is constant, it has no effect on the final
phase estimation.
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|i〉
|x1〉
|y1〉
|λ = 0〉
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Fig. 10: Signed windowed elliptic curve addition, with ` address qubits. Ini is the indexing half of
the look-up gate, which writes the classical data shown into the output registers. The width of the
circuits is proportional to the number of auxiliary qubits used.
6 Results
We present quantum resource estimates for Shor’s algorithm based on our cost estimates for
windowed elliptic curve point addition. Results are obtained for optimizing three different cost
metrics: either minimizing circuit width (i.e. the total number of logical qubits), the total number
of T gates in the circuit, or total circuit depth. Window sizes above 18 were too large to simulate,
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so we extrapolated from the costs for smaller lookup tables. With Q#, we calculated the cost of
a point addition on the three NIST curves [34] P256, P384 and P521, using 8-bit look-ups, then
subtracted the cost of six 8-bit look-ups and added the cost of six `-bit look-ups to get the cost of
point addition with an `-bit window. We multiplied this cost by the number of windows dividing
2n to get the full cost of Shor’s algorithm for ECDLP. From this we manually selected optimal
window sizes. We can use n instead of n+ 1 because the order of each NIST curve is less than its
modulus [34].
Table 1 shows our results together with those of RNSL [27] for comparison. Their circuits use
fewer than 2 Toffoli gates per time step on average, so we assume that with 8 extra qubits (c.f.
Section 3) they can use Toffoli gates of T-depth 1. Our optimization for the number of qubits is
shown in the row labeled Low W. Since RNSL optimize for the same metric, those results allow a
direct comparison. We were able to improve on RNSL’s circuit in all metrics. For P256, we reduce
the number of logical qubits from 2338 to 2124, while reducing the T -depth and T -count by factors
of 54 and 119, respectively.
Additionally, we report more significant improvements over RNSL’s work in depth and T -count
when optimizing for those. For 521-bit moduli, the improvement is a factor of 13,792 in depth for
an increase of 22% in qubits, or a 463 factor reduction in T -gates for a 12% increase in qubits.
Circuit
Window Gates Depth Width
Size Cliffords Measure T Total T All gates Qubits
256-bit modulus
RNSL – – – 1.60 · 239 – 1.69 · 236 – 2338
Low W 19 1.32 · 234 1.76 · 226 1.72 · 232 1.45 · 235 1.98 · 230 1.89 · 232 2124
Low T 19 1.75 · 233 1.95 · 227 1.08 · 231 1.80 · 234 1.44 · 229 1.85 · 231 2619
Low D 15 1.04 · 234 1.61 · 228 1.34 · 232 1.40 · 234 1.12 · 224 1.40 · 227 2871
384-bit modulus
RNSL – – – 1.44 · 241 – 1.51 · 238 – 3492
Low W 21 1.46 · 236 1.23 · 229 1.51 · 234 1.57 · 237 1.68 · 232 1.77 · 234 3151
Low T 19 1.05 · 235 1.28 · 229 1.74 · 232 1.10 · 236 1.21 · 231 1.31 · 233 3901
Low D 15 1.73 · 235 1.34 · 230 1.13 · 234 1.17 · 236 1.23 · 225 1.48 · 228 4278
521-bit modulus
RNSL – – – 1.81 · 242 – 1.91 · 239 – 4727
Low W 22 1.85 · 237 1.59 · 230 1.82 · 235 1.98 · 238 1.99 · 233 1.09 · 236 4258
Low T 20 1.45 · 235 1.49 · 230 1.00 · 234 1.57 · 236 1.40 · 232 1.54 · 234 5273
Low D 15 1.10 · 237 1.70 · 231 1.43 · 235 1.48 · 237 1.13 · 226 1.27 · 229 5789
Table 1: Resource estimates for Shor’s full algorithm to compute the ECDLP. RNSL results are
taken from [27]. Rows labeled Low W/Low T/ Low D show estimates for circuits minimizing width,
T gate count and total depth, respectively.
Asymptotic formulas. We ran resource estimates for the various components of the elliptic
curve point addition circuits on a range of input bit sizes. We then determined models for fitting
the data with linear regression and deduced asymptotic formulas for the costs of these operations
parameterized by the bit size n. Tables 2, 3 and 4 in Appendix D show the results of our experiments.
Table 4 also shows such formulas for a full signed windowed elliptic curve point addition and the
full circuit of Shor’s algorithm using such point addition. The results show that our circuit optimized
for low width can solve the ECDLP on an n-bit elliptic curve with about 8n+ 10.2 blg nc− 1 logical
qubits using roughly 436n3− 1.05 · 226 T -gates at a T -depth of 120n3− 1.67 · 222. The total number
of gates is 2900n3 − 1.08 · 231 with depth 509n3 − 1.84 · 227.
Our circuits optimized for a low number of T gates require about 10n+ 7.4 blg nc+ 1.3 qubits
and need 1115n3/ lg n− 1.08 · 224 T gates with T depth 389n3/ lg n− 1.70 · 222. Optimizing for low
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depth brings down the overall depth to 2523n2 + 1.10 · 220 and the T -depth to 285n2 − 1.54 · 217,
but requires 11n+ 3.9 blg nc+ 16.5 qubits.
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A Alternative approaches
A.1 Modular multiplication.
RNSL provide two circuits for modular multiplication. The first is the one proposed by Proos
and Zalka [25], which uses a double-and-add approach, where doubling and addition are both
modular operations modulo p. The other is reversible Montgomery multiplication, which uses an
add-and-halve approach and works in Montgomery form. The primary motivation for considering
Montgomery multiplication instead of the straightforward double-and-add method is that modular
reduction is achieved by suitable additions to clear lower order bits and divisions by 2 (i.e. bit
rotations) as part of the whole circuit, not delegated to the addition and halving circuits. This
results in simpler operations per bit.
However, Montgomery multiplication has the downside that it entangles with a register of
auxiliary qubits which must be cleared. In our case, at every point in an elliptic curve point
addition, we have enough spare auxiliary qubits for this. Overall, it is cheaper, even with the
Bennett method, and especially with the multiply-then-add technique of Section 4.1.
Rines and Chuang recently provided high-performance modular multipliers [26]. A direct
comparison is difficult, since they give costs in Toffoli gates. Our low-T multiplier scales as
38n2 + o(n2) T gates, while their best exact multiplier uses 4n2 Toffoli gates, suggesting perhaps
28n2 T gates. However, some of these Toffoli gates might be replaceable with AND gates. Their
adder seems to use 4.5n additions, slightly more than our 2n+O(n/ log n) additions. We leave a
true comparison and Q# implementation for future work.
A.2 Modular Inversion.
Proos and Zalka [25] (PZ) gave an approach to modular inversion based on precise control of a
bit-shift division operation, with asymptotic complexity of O(n2). There are O(n) iterations of a
round. Each round implements conditional logic by computing state qubits, then using those state
qubits to control some operations on the integer registers.
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RNSL use a similar round-based construction, which implements a reversible binary extended
Euclidean algorithm. As with multiplication, the primary difference between the PZ division and
the RNSL division is that PZ’s is based on doubling and integer long division, while RNSL’s is
based on halving and binary operations. The PZ inversion leaves only O(lg n) auxiliary qubits,
while RNSL creates 2n+O(lg n) auxiliary qubits, but PZ has a higher depth and gate cost.
Naively, the PZ approach uses 5n qubits, though they show that, with fidelity loss on the order
of O(n−3) per round, they require only 2n+ 8
√
n+O(log n) qubits. The RNSL approach uses 6n
qubits. We choose to use the RNSL algorithm. It is exactly correct, so it can be used for higher
depth algorithms, and the total T-cost and depth are less than half of the PZ approach.
A.3 Recursive GCD Algorithms.
There are several sub-quadratic GCD algorithms (such as [7]). These work by defining a series of
2× 2 matrices Tn such that TnTn−1 · · ·T1(u, v)T will map integers u and v to the nth step of the
Euclidean algorithm. These can be computed and multiplied together recursively.
Adapted to quantum circuits, these approaches require quantum matrix multiplication. We
could find no efficient method to do this in-place, meaning that each recursive call would require a
new set of auxiliary qubits to store the matrix output. This would quickly overwhelm our qubit
budget. The base case of [7] is nearly identical to our approach for a single round.
One of the primary advantages of [7] is that the recursive process allows much of the arithmetic
to be done with small integers which fit into the registers of classical CPUs. All the qubits in our
model of a quantum computer are identical, so it has no caching or register issues. If quantum
technologies arise with different kinds of qubits (perhaps a “memory” with higher coherence times
but lower gate fidelity), then recursive GCD algorithms should be revisited. It is also possible
that the specific structure of the matrices in this approach permit an easy, in-place multiplication
circuit. We leave this to future work.
A.4 Alternate curve representations
Projective coordinates. Projective coordinates use equivalence classes (X : Y : Z) of triples
(X,Y, Z) to represent an elliptic curve point, where (X1, Y1, Z1) ∼ (X2, Y2, Z2) iff there is some
non-zero constant c such that X1 = cX2, Y1 = cY2, and Z2 = cZ2. These can be used with
many different families of curves. Projective coordinates lend themselves to efficient, inversion-free
arithmetic, which is appealing for classical computers.
Projective coordinates do not give a unique representation of each point, which Shor’s algorithm
requires to ensure history independence and thus proper interference of states in superposition.
Dividing by the Z coordinate produces a unique representation but requires an expensive division.
It is an open problem to provide a unique projective representation with division-free arithmetic.
Another issue is that the classical elliptic curve formulas, naively adapted to quantum circuits,
operate out-of-place. An out-of-place addition circuit is easy to adapt into an in-place addition
circuit. If we can construct a circuit U+Q to add a point Q, we can construct a circuit U−Q, and
we can construct an in-place point addition as shown in Figure 11 up to a final swap of the two
qubit registers. This doubles the cost of point addition.
∣∣P〉
|0〉
n
n
+Q −Q†
|0〉∣∣P +Q〉
Fig. 11: An in-place point addition from out-of-place.
This technique requires a unique representation. If (P + Q) − Q does not have the same
representation as P , we cannot cancel them out. Thus, for any current algorithm to compute
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addition with projective coordinates with cost C, we can transform it to a quantum-suitable
in-place version with cost 2C + 2D, where D is the cost of division. The division creates a unique
representation.
Some projective coordinate systems such as projective x-only Montgomery coordinates can
only handle differential addition. In this case, we start with P , Q, and Q− P , and use Q− P as a
helper to compute P +Q. We did not find a method to clear the register with P from the outputs
Q, Q− P , and P +Q, so we are further restricted to curves that have direct addition formulas.
According to the Explicit Formulas Database [6], the lowest-cost addition, possibly assuming
Z = 1 for the initial point, uses 6 squares and/or multiplications. With the required reductions,
the total cost is 12 squares/multiplications and 2 divisions, much higher than affine Weierstrass
coordinates. Thus, we choose not to use projective coordinates in this work.
Elliptic curve point addition in affine Montgomery coordinates. An alternative affine
coordinate system is provided by elliptic curves in Montgomery form
by2 = x3 + ax2 + x. (3)
Again, we represent points as pairs (x, y) that satisfy the curve equation.
Following the reference implementation for affine coordinate addition from [16], we construct
the circuit in Figure 12. This uses one more register than affine Weierstrass coordinates, one more
multiplication, and one more squaring.
|x1〉
|y1〉
|ctrl〉
|λ = 0〉∣∣λ2 = 0〉
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
b b
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
n
n
n
−x2
−y2 div
div
div
mul
mul
mul
+3x2 + a
squA
mul−
mul−
mul−
squ−1A
mul
mul
mul
−2x2
div
div
div
neg
−y2
−x2
Fig. 12: Constant point addition in affine Montgomery coordinates.
However, we note that the main source of extra costs is that, for a slope λ, there is a bλ3 term.
This requires 4 sequential multiplications/squarings. If we are lucky enough to have a curve where
b = 1, then we save space and operations by directly adding the λ2 to the x1 register. In fact,
in this case, we can simply use the Weierstrass addition circuit, so long as we replace the +3x2
operator with +3x2 + a. Thus, we have no reason to prefer affine Montgomery coordinates, and we
will continue to use short Weierstrass form.
A.5 Precomputation.
Precomputed tables of certain powers of the base element can speed up exponentiations. The
“comb” method is a standard technique used for elliptic curve scalar multiplication. To multiply a
point P by a scalar k, we divide k into k1 + 2k2 + · · ·+ 2`k` for some `, with the property that
kj contains bits of k in positions congruent to j modulo ` (each kj looks like a comb of bits). We
then precompute a table of all multiples of P by scalars of the form b0 + b12
` + b22
2` . . . , with
bi ∈ {0, 1}. By the definition of kj , each kjP is a precomputed point in this table for all j. Thus,
we can compute kP by using kj to look up elements of the table, adding them to a running total,
and doubling the running total.
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The advantage of the comb technique is that it saves precomputation. We only precompute one
table and use it for the entire computation. Unfortunately for the quantum case, precomputation is
essentially free because it is entirely classical, but look-ups are expensive. The comb technique does
not reduce the number of table look-ups, since we must do a separate look-up for each index kj .
Further, efficient in-place point doubling is unlikely, since it implies efficient in-place point
halving. Thus, doubling points in the comb would require some pebbling technique which would
likely add significant depth or width costs.
B Modular division and addition
For elliptic curve addition, we only need to divide integers and copy the result to a blank output,
but other applications may wish to construct a circuit that, given registers containing x, y, and z,
will compute yx−1 + z.
We might simply invert, multiply, and then add the output of the multiplication instead of
copying. However, doubling the output to correct the pseudo-inverse while uncomputing will also
multiply z by a factor of 22n−k. To correct for this, we can repeatedly halve z during the forward
computation of the modular inverse. This means that while we compute the modular inverse, we
control a modular halving of the register containing z by the counter, which will halve z exactly
2n− k times. Then we multiply the pseudo-inverse by y and add the result to the register with z,
producing the state∣∣x−122n−k mod p〉 |y2n mod p〉 ∣∣z22n−k + x−1y22n−k mod p〉 . (4)
From here, if we perform controlled modular doublings of the register containing z as we uncompute
the inversion circuit, this will correct both z and the pseudo-inverse of x, producing the desired
output.
C Analysis of windowed arithmetic
A quantum look-up to N elements requires 4N T-gates [2]. To optimize window costs, we balance
this cost against the operations we save.
Multiplication. Section 4.1 describes a single windowed multiplication round. For n-bit integers
with window size k, repeating this round dn/ke times performs the full multiplication. Since the
quantum look-up will cost 4 · 2k T gates [2] and uncontrolled n+ k-bit addition costs O(n+ k) T
gates, we expect the optimal window size to be approximately k = O(lg n). The total multiplication
cost is still O(n2) because we only window addition by p, not addition of the quantum register
y. Compared to un-windowed add-and-halve multiplication, windowing should save a factor of
roughly 12 +O(
1
lgn ). Similar reasoning suggests savings of
1
2 +O(
1
lg lgn ) in depth.
Numerical estimates show a window size of k = c1 lg n+ c2 optimizes T -count, where 0.68 ≤
c1 ≤ 0.75 and 0.12 ≤ c2 ≤ 0.78, and 1.97 lg lg n− 1.11 optimizes T -depth. At the scale we estimate,
this is only noticeable in the leading coefficient of the cost. We found a 22% reduction in T -depth
at 384 bits, for example.
Windowing adds a significant cost of roughly n+ k auxiliary qubits, but the full elliptic curve
point addition circuit has enough unused auxiliary qubits during any multiplication that this does
not make a difference.
Point addition. Windowing requires 2 extra registers as the cache to load the precomputed
points. We use the components of the second point three times during point addition (see Figure
9). We could perform the look-up once and keep the values, increasing total circuit width by two
registers. Alternatively, we can fit the look-ups within the existing space. As Figure 9 shows, at
every point where x2 or y2 are added, the circuit has spare auxiliary qubits available. Thus, we can
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perform the look-up, add the point to the quantum register, then uncompute the quantum look-up
to free the qubits for the expensive modular division. This requires us six look-ups (including
uncomputing) rather than just two, but uses no extra registers.
With a window size of `, including sign bit, each look-up costs 4 · 2`−1 T gates and T -depth.
The windowing saves us `− 1 point additions. If point addition costs A T gates, we would expect
` ≈ lg(A/24) to be the optimal value, leading to a factor ` reduction in T-gate cost.
D Numerical results and interpolations
We also estimated the costs for the basic operations that comprise the elliptic curve addition.
With Q#, we counted resources for arithmetic operations for all bit sizes from 4 up to 64, then
for random bit sizes between 65 and 2048. Based on theoretical analysis and examining the best fit,
we decided on the best model and then fit the data with linear regression. Tables 2 and 3 show the
results.
For modular arithmetic, we counted resources for all bit sizes from 4 to 64, then the common
elliptic curve bit sizes 110, 160, 224, 256, 384, and 521. These were the only larger bit sizes we
estimated due to the high computational cost of performing these estimates. With linear regression
we estimated only the leading term of the cost growth. Table 4 contains these costs.
We found that addition with the DKRS adder had very different depths for numbers with an
odd bitlength compared to an even bitlength. This behaviour is likely due to the structure of the
binary tree for carry bit propagation. Odd bitlengths were much cheaper, so we opted to simply
allocate an extra qubit to add two numbers of even bitlengths.
We also noticed that addition and modular addition are substantially more expensive when
controlled, while constant addition and modular doubling costs increase only negligibly. The
T-depth of the uncontrolled DKRS adder increases monotonically with bitlength. The data for the
controlled DKRS adder is much noisier. Hence, the apparent growth of the lg n term is slower than
the controlled DKRS adder, which is nonsensical; this is likely just an artifact of the noise.
For the final set of formulas for the entire cost of Shor’s algorithm, we extrapolated the costs for
a single point addition, then performed the same optimization as Section 6 describes. Though the
exact cost was not convex, it should be O(n/ lg n) times the cost of a single addition, and indeed
such a curve fit the data well (r2 > 0.98 for the depth and gate costs).
E Automatic compilation for aggressive T-count and T-depth
reduction
In this section, we motivate automatic compilation methods to drastically reduce the T -count and
the T -depth if we allow a significant increase in circuit width.
The modular multiplication followed by an addition is one of the most costly operations in
the overall algorithm. It is implemented as a unitary U : |x〉|y〉|z〉|0〉 7→ |x〉|y〉|(xy + z) mod p〉|0〉
that adds the result of the multiplication of two numbers x and y onto a third number z, all
in Montgomery form with bit-width n and modulus p. We apply the following procedure to
automatically obtain a quantum circuit for this operation:
1. We generate logic networks over the gate basis {AND,XOR, INV}, called Xor-And-inverter
Graphs (XAGs), for the functions xy mod p, (x+ y) mod p, and (x− y) mod p, where x and y
are integers in Montgomery form.
2. We apply the logic optimization method described in [33] to minimize the number of AND
gates in the XAGs.
3. The optimized XAGs are then translated into out-of-place quantum circuits using the method
in [19], which requires 4 T gates for each AND gate in the XAG. Optimizing these circuits
for depth requires roughly 2 qubits for each AND gate in the XAG, by using the AND gate
construction from Section 3.
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Circuit Metric Depth Gates Qubits
In/out Auxiliary Total
Fanin
Low W
T 13.50n− 30.61 56.0n− 168
n 2 n+ 2
All 40.5n− 89.8 130n− 382
Low T/D
T 0.99 lgn+ 0.48 4.00n− 4.00
n n+ 1 2n+ 1
All 6.98 lgn+ 8.38 22.2n− 16.2
Addition
Low W
T 9.00n− 4.00 14.0n− 7.0
2n 1 2n+ 1
All 31.0n− 15.0 47.0n− 22.0
Low T
T 1.00n+ 0.00 4.00n+ 0.00
2n n+ 2 3n+ 2
All 12.0n+ 0.2 30.2n+ 0.5
Low D
T 3.86 lgn+ 1.16 39.9n− 206
2n 3n− 6.8 5n− 6.8
All 28.8 lgn+ 14.5 172n− 853
Addition (Controlled)
Low W
T 14.00n+ 9.00 21.0n+ 14.0
2n+ 1 2 2n+ 3
All 45.0n+ 13.8 65.0n+ 36.0
Low T
T 11.0n− 0.0 18.0n+ 0.0
2n+ 1 n+ 2 3n+ 3
All 39.0n+ 3.0 66.3n+ 4.7
Low D
T 2.38 lgn+ 24.79 53.9n− 191
2n+ 1 3n− 2.8 5n− 1.8
All 25.6 lgn+ 67.5 222n− 815
Comparator
Low W
T 9.00n− 4.00 14.0n− 7.0
2n 1 2n+ 1
All 30.0n− 12.0 48.0n− 22.0
Low T
T 1.00n+ 0.00 4.00n+ 0.00
2n n+ 2 3n+ 2
All 13.0n− 1.4 32.2n+ 1.0
Low D
T 3.75 lgn+ 1.27 35.9n− 170
2n 2n− 1.4 4n− 1.4
All 27.7 lgn+ 3.9 148n− 674
Comparator (Controlled)
Low W
T 9.00n+ 10.00 14.0n+ 14.0
2n+ 1 3 2n+ 4
All 30.0n+ 30.0 48.0n+ 36.0
Low T
T 1.00n+ 5.00 4.00n+ 7.00
2n+ 1 n+ 2 3n+ 3
All 13.0n+ 12.7 32.2n+ 13.3
Low D
T 3.08 lgn+ 12.7 35.9n− 155
2n+ 1 2n− 1.4 2n− 0.4
All 25.5 lgn+ 27.5 148n− 605
Addition (No Carry)
Low W
T 9.00n− 8.00 14.0n− 14.0
2n 0 2n
All 31.0n− 30.0 47.0n− 44.0
Low T
T 1.00n+ 0.00 4.00n+ 0.00
2n n+ 1 3n+ 1
All 12.0n− 0.8 30.2n− 0.1
Low D
T 4.03 lgn− 0.49 39.9n− 251
2n 3n− 10.1 5n− 10.1
All 29.4 lgn+ 9.2 172n− 1032
Addition (No Carry, Controlled)
Low W
T 14.00n− 9.00 21.0n− 14.0
2n+ 1 0 2n+ 1
All 45.0n− 44.2 65.0n− 42.0
Low T
T 11.0n− 5.0 18.0n− 7.0
2n+ 1 n+ 1 3n+ 2
All 39.0n− 12.0 66.3n− 22.9
Low D
T 3.73 lgn+ 4.35 53.9n− 258
2n+ 1 3n− 6.1 5n− 5.1
All 29.2 lgn+ 24.8 222n− 1054
Table 2: Basic arithmetic estimates.
19
Circuit Metric Depth Gates Qubits
In/out Auxiliary Total
Constant Addition
Low W
T 53.9n− 307 44n lgn− 7252
n 1.6 n+ 1.6
All 176n− 767 122n lgn− 18983
Low T
T 1.00n+ 0.00 4.00n+ 0.00
n 2n+ 1 3n+ 1
All 12.0n+ 1.7 28.3n+ 80.7
Low D
T 4.03 lgn− 1.49 35.9n− 247
n 3n− 10.1 4n− 10.1
All 29.2 lgn+ 1.7 147n− 940
Constant Addition (Controlled)
Low W
T 19n lgn− 1870 45n lgn− 6120
n+ 1 0 n+ 1
All 62n lgn− 5721 126n lgn− 16076
Low T
T 1.00n+ 0.00 4.00n+ 0.00
n+ 1 2n+ 1 3n+ 2
All 12.0n+ 3.8 28.3n+ 87.7
Low D
T 4.03 lgn− 0.49 42.9n− 254
n+ 1 3n− 6.1 4n− 5.1
All 29.2 lgn+ 9.6 173n− 950
Modular Addition
Low W
T 30.8n lgn− 168 87.0n lgn− 2433
2n 1 2n+ 1
All 101n lgn− 779 261n lgn− 8827
Low T
T 4.00n− 2.00 16.0n+ 4.0
2n 2n+ 4 4n+ 4
All 49.0n− 23.1 111n+ 147
Low D
T 15.6 lgn+ 1.1 155n− 843
2n 3n− 3.7 5n− 3.7
All 111lgn+ 29 633n− 3268
Modular Addition (Controlled)
Low W
T 31.5n lgn− 210 87.8n lgn− 2280
2n+ 1 2 2n+ 3
All 102n lgn− 523 263n lgn− 8434
Low T
T 14.0n+ 4.0 30.0n+ 11.0
2n+ 1 2n+ 4 4n+ 5
All 76.0n+ 0.5 147n+ 164
Low D
T 13.4 lgn+ 36.2 169n− 812
2n+ 1 3n− 1.8 5n− 0.8
All 106lgn+ 102 683n− 3179
Modular Doubling
Low W
T 28.3nlgn− 484 83.9n lgn− 2526
n 2.5 n+ 2.5
All 92.3n lgn− 1382 252n lgn− 9314
Low T
T 2.00n+ 10.00 15.0n+ 4.0
n 2n+ 4 3n+ 4
All 24.0n+ 32.8 79.8n+ 165.4
Low D
T 7.98lgn+ 8.75 85.8n− 466
n 3n− 3.7 4n− 3.7
All 58.0lgn+ 50.9 343n− 1757
Modular Doubling (Controlled)
Low W
T 28.9nlgn− 416 84.7n lgn− 2451
n+ 1 1.5 n+ 2.5
All 94.0n lgn− 1185 254n lgn− 9102
Low T
T 2.00n+ 14.0 15.0n+ 11.0
n+ 1 2n+ 5 3n+ 6
All 24.0n+ 51.9 79.9n+ 185
Low D
T 7.98lgn+ 13.8 85.8n− 459
n+ 1 3n− 3.7 4n− 2.7
All 60.0lgn+ 61.8 343n− 1723
Table 3: Alternate arithmetic estimates.
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Circuit Metric Depth Gates Qubits
In/out Auxiliary Total
Modular Squaring
Low W
T 3.54n2 lgn+ 1.32 · 215 5.62n2 lgn+ 1.24 · 216
2n 3n+ 15.1 5n+ 15.1
All 11.5n2 lgn+ 1.09 · 217 17.3n2 lgn+ 1.94 · 217
Low T
T 21.4n2 + 1.43 · 210 37.8n2 + 1.37 · 212
2n 4n+ 12.3 6n+ 12.3
All 75.7n2 + 1.46 · 213 143n2 + 1.74 · 215
Low D
T 11.5n lgn+ 1.88 · 29 124n2 + 1.29 · 212
2n 6n+ 11.6 8n+ 11.6
All 86.4n lgn+ 1.40 · 211 509n2 + 1.56 · 215
Modular Multiplication
Low W
T 3.54n2 lgn+ 1.35 · 215 5.62n2 lgn+ 1.28 · 216
3n 3n+ 15.0 6n+ 15.0
All 11.5n2 lgn+ 1.12 · 217 17.3n2 lgn+ 2.00 · 217
Low T
T 21.4n2 + 1.35 · 210 37.8n2 + 1.40 · 212
3n 4n+ 12.2 7n+ 12.2
All 75.7n2 + 1.45 · 213 143n2 + 1.73 · 215
Low D
T 11.4n lgn+ 1.84 · 29 124n2 + 1.29 · 212
3n 6n+ 11.6 9n+ 11.6
All 84.8n lgn+ 1.42 · 211 509n2 + 1.54 · 215
Modular Inversion
Low W
T 72n2 lgn+ 1.76 · 216 236n2 lgn+ 1.30 · 218
2n 5n+ 1 blgnc+ 11 7n+ 1 blgnc+ 11
All 233n2 lgn+ 1.44 · 218 703n2 lgn+ 1.49 · 219
Low T
T 162n2 + 1.09 · 212 496n2 + 1.70 · 214
2n 7n+ 1 blgnc+ 11 9n+ 1 blgnc+ 11
All 592n2 + 1.42 · 214 1789n2 + 1.96 · 216
Low D
T 84.4n lgn+ 1.10 · 212 1062n2 − 1.28 · 216
2n 8n+ 12.8 10n+ 12.8
All 529n lgn+ 1.83 · 213 4162n2 − 1.28 · 218
Modular Division
Low W
T 76n2 lgn+ 1.26 · 217 243n2 lgn+ 1.66 · 218
3n 5n+ 3.1 blgnc+ 9.7 8n+ 3.1 blgnc+ 9.7
All 245n2 lgn+ 1.02 · 219 722n2 lgn+ 1.03 · 220
Low T
T 184n2 + 1.46 · 212 534n2 + 1.03 · 215
2n 8n+ 1 blgnc+ 11 10n+ 1 blgnc+ 11
All 667n2 + 1.12 · 215 1932n2 + 1.43 · 217
Low D
T 95.8n lgn+ 1.35 · 212 1186n2 − 1.13 · 216
2n 9n+ 18.8 11n+ 18.8
All 614n lgn+ 1.12 · 214 4672n2 − 1.01 · 218
Signed Windowed Elliptic Curve Point Addition (window size 8)
Low W
T 144n2 lgn+ 1.19 · 219 503n2 lgn+ 1.26 · 220
2n 6n+ 3.8 blgnc+ 17.1 8n+ 3.8 blgnc+ 17.1
All 465n2 lgn+ 1.98 · 220 1423n2 lgn+ 1.99 · 221
Low T
T 432n2 + 1.07 · 214 1182n2 + 1.41 · 216
2n 8n+ 1.5 blgnc+ 18.9 10n+ 1.5 blgnc+ 18.9
All 1562n2 + 1.85 · 216 4306n2 + 1.31 · 219
Low D
T 226n lgn+ 1.77 · 213 2746n2 − 1.31 · 216
2n 9n+ 28.6 11n+ 28.6
All 1485n lgn+ 1.60 · 215 10891n2 − 1.39 · 216
Shor’s algorithm (with signed windowed point addition)
Low W
T 120n3 − 1.67 · 222 436n3 − 1.05 · 226
2n 6n+ 10.2 blgnc − 1.0 8n+ 10.2 blgnc − 1.0
All 509n3 − 1.84 · 227 2800n3 − 1.08 · 231
Low T
T 389n3/ lgn− 1.70 · 222 1115n3/ lgn− 1.08 · 224
2n 8n+ 7.4 blgnc+ 1.3 10n+ 7.4 blgnc+ 1.3
All 1701n3/ lgn− 1.23 · 224 6262n3/ lgn− 1.72 · 224
Low D
T 285n2 − 1.54 · 217 3120n3/ lgn− 1.49 · 227
2n 9n+ 3.9 blgnc+ 16.5 11n+ 3.9 blgnc+ 16.5
All 2523n2 + 1.10 · 220 12478n3/ lgn− 1.25 · 229
Table 4: Estimates for non-linear modular arithmetic, elliptic curve point addition and Shor’s
algorithm.
21
|x〉
|y〉
|0〉
|z〉
n
n
n
n
×
|0〉
|xy〉
n
+ −†
|0〉
|xy〉
|xy + z〉 ×
†
|x〉
|y〉
|0〉
|xy + z〉
Fig. 13: Quantum circuit that implements xy+z mod p, using out-of-place constructions for modular
multiplication, modular addition, and modular subtraction.
4. The automatically generated unitaries are composed as described in Figure 13, which uses the
technique shown in Figure 11 to turn the out-of-place addition and subtraction into an in-place
addition.
Table 5: Comparison of resource costs between a manual and automatic construction to implement
|xy + z mod p〉.
Manual construction Automatic construction
Bit-width T -count T -depth Width T -count T -depth Width
256 8,176,739 50,253 2,319 1,576,296 1,542 394,588
384 18,322,671 76,125 3,470 3,550,552 2,310 888,408
521 33,751,240 137,183 4,702 6,535,384 3,132 1,634,890
Table 5 lists the resource costs in terms of T -count, T -depth, and circuit width, for both the
manual construction and the automatic construction. Several factors of reduction in T -count and
T -depth are possible, while the increase in the number of qubits is significant. However, such a
design point can be of high interest, in particular when combined with automatic quantum memory
strategies, e.g., pebbling [20], that can find intermediate trade-off points that lie in between the
manual and automatic construction.
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